CONTROL AND/OR MISCONDUCT:
CLARIFYING THE TEST FOR PIERCING
THE CORPORATE VEIL IN ALASKA*
I. NTRODUCTION
"Piercing the corporate veil" refers to instances in which a court
disregards the fundamental principle of limited liability of a corporate
entity and instead imposes liability on its shareholders beyond the amount
they contributed to the corporation in exchange for shares. Veil-piercing
doctrines generally exist under state law. Moreover, they tend to exist
within a state's common law; veil-piercing is conspicuously absent from
most states' corporation statutes.1 This lack of statutory guidance makes
these doctrines rather amorphous. Justice Cardozo once described the law
and language surrounding the various doctrines as "enveloped in the mists
of metaphor."2 Other commentators have also noted such ambiguity3 and
criticized these doctrines.4 One researcher, conducting a survey of the
piercing law in the United States, commented that "the boundaries of [the
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1. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1041 (1991). But see Daniel W. Fessler, The Alaska Corporations
Code: The Forty-NinthState Claims the Middle Ground,7 ALASKA L. REv. 1,59-61 (1990)
(detailing a statute that imposes secondary liability on officers and directors but does not
implicate "the terms [or the goals" of the common law piercing doctrine).
2. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926), reh'g den., 155 N.E. 914
(N.Y. 1927).
3. See Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtorto Its Creditors,90 HARV.
L. REV. 505, 541 (1977) (stating that "cases attempting to pierce the corporate veil are
unified more by the remedy sought -- subjecting to corporate liabilities the personal assets
directly held by shareholders -- than by repeated and consistent application of the same
criteria for granting the remedy."); Thompson, supra note 1, at 1036-37, and the sources
cited therein.
4. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. Cmt. L. Rv. 89 (1985) (concluding that "'[p]iercing' seems to happen
freakishly. Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that
the whole area of limited liability, and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among
the most confusing in corporate law."), reprinted in 27 CORPORATE PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 313, 314 (1985).
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doctrine] ... are usually stated in broad terms that offer little guidance to
judges or litigants in subsequent cases." 5
The veil-piercing doctrine in Alaska is no exception to this general
uncertainty. Commentators on the Alaska piercing law have been unable
to present a clear or definitive explanation of the Alaska doctrine.6 The
Alaska Supreme Court, which has been responsible for the development of
the veil-piercing doctrine within the state,7 has contributed to this

uncertainty by oscillating between two competing veil-piercing tests: 8 a

"disjunctive" test and a "conjunctive" test.9 Both tests involve an inquiry
into two "prongs" of analysis: (1) control of the corporation and (2)
misconduct by the corporation or its shareholders." The tests differ,
however, in the weight and force given to each of these prongs."
This note will demonstrate that the two prongs necessarily overlap and
that both the disjunctive and conjunctive tests examine control and

5. Thompson, supra note 1, at 1036.
6. See, e.g., PHILLW L BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS -- TORT,
CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIvE LAW OF PARENT

AND SUBSmIARY CORPORATIONS § 18.02.2, at 389-90 (1987) (characterizing the doctrine
in Alaska as "undergoing active evolution"); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE
CORPORATE VEIL § 2.02, at 2-9 (1991) (stating that "the alternative approaches suggested
...leave the piercing law in Alaska subject to much uncertainty").
7. Although there are federal (Ninth Circuit) cases that address piercing the veil in
Alaska, they are not generally included in this doctrinal examination as they make no
reference to, nor are they consistently referred to, in the cases decided by the Alaska
Supreme Court. See Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 871 (1989); Kilkenny v. Arco Marine, Inc., 800 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); Hoss v. Purinton, 229 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 997 (1956). But see infra note 148.
8. Ironically, all of the Alaska Supreme Court cases that have addressed the piercing
issue have been unanimously decided. That no justice has dissented despite the court's
frequent vacillation is suggestive that, notwithstanding the unsettled nature of the doctrine,
the court would have reached the same decisions under either the conjunctive or the
disjunctive test described herein. See infra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
9. Although the court has never used the terms "conjunctive" or "disjunctive," this
author has adopted such terms because they illustrate the effect of the tests imposed by the
court.
10. For purposes of nomenclature in this note, the "control" prong will be evaluated as
an inquiry to determine whether such control is excessive or rises to the level at which the
corporate form becomes a mere "instrumentality." The Alaska Supreme Court has also
referred to the "control" or "instrumentality" prong as the "quantitative" prong. The
"misconduct" prong examines whether there is serious wrongdoing that "defeat[s] public
convenience, justiffies] wrong, commit[s] fraud or defend[s] crime." United States v.
Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
11. A brief example will illustrate the meaning of each prong. In Eagle Air, Inc. v.
Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982), a case in which the Alaska
Supreme Court pierced the veil, the controlprong was satisfied when a parent corporation
had purchased all of the stock of a second corporation and had equipped that newly acquired
subsidiary with helicopters leased from another of its subsidiaries. The court also found
misconduct, separate from the control element, because the assets of the acquired subsidiary
had been stripped by the parent corporation. Id. at 1002, 1004.
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misconduct. The Alaska Supreme Court will consider the piercing issue
in terms of misconduct only where there is some control or connection to
the corporate form, albeit not necessarily amounting to the level of
instrumentality. Similarly, the court will pierce the veil under the
instrumentality prong only where there is a suggestion of "misuse," which

may or may not be tantamount to traditional misconduct. Instrumentality
and misconduct are thus threshold levels relating to the prongs of both tests

employed in Alaska.
As stated above, the difference between the two tests lies in the weight
given to both elements, rather than any substantive disagreement over the
nature of the elements. The first test presented by the Alaska Supreme
Court was a disjunctive test, in which a showing of eitherexcessive control
or other corporate misconduct sufficed for the court to pierce the veil. The
second test was a conjunctive test, in which both control and misconduct
had to be proven to warrant the court's disregard of the corporate entity.2
In the Alaska Supreme Court's construction of the conjunctive test, the
second prong examines whether there has been some serious misconduct
rising above the level of corporate misuse implicit in any finding of
instrumentality under the control inquiry. 3

12. The conjunctive test has also been advanced by the court in terms of "priority" and
"combination" Despite the different terminology, both are functionally conjunctive tests.
In reality, the tests may appear as a single test (disjunctive) or a dual test (conjunctive).
In all of the Alaska cases in which the court has had to make a choice between the tests,
the issue has been reduced to the following: given that there is control with which the
disjunctive test permits piercing the veil, does the court require an additional showing of
misconduct as part of a conjunctive test? In other words, the disjunctive test has imposed
liability following a showing of excessive control only, while the conjunctive test has
proceeded to the misconduct question only after control has been established. This result
is probably due to the fact that veil-piercing is inappropriate absent some connection of the
allegedly improper action to the corporate form. Disregarding the veil of corporate
protection is not the standard remedy for the fraud plaintiff unless the defendant has misused
e corporate mechanism. Thus, the misconduct prong looks at whether the corporateform
has been used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud or defend crime.
The particular facts of the cases may lead the reader to conceptualize a vacillation
between a one-step test requiring only a showing of control, and a two-step test requiring
control plus misconduct.
Nevertheless, the author prefers to retain the
conjunctive/disjunctive dichotomy as that model is suggested by the cases and would include
the possible, albeit currently nonexistent, scenario in which a court employing a disjunctive
test would consider piercing the veil where there was serious misconduct that was connected
to the corporate form but did not necessarily satisfy the control prong.
13. Such additional misconduct has generally been in the nature of common law fraud.
However, the court has indicated that actual fraud is not required to satisfy the misconduct
prong under the conjunctive test. EagleAir, 648 P.2d at 1000. See infra text accompanying
notes 129-41 for a clarification of this distinction. Professor Fessler, surveying Alaska
corporate law, has argued that "the plaintiffs success [is] dependent upon demonstrating
some significant transgression by the defendant in the use of the corporate creature."
Fessler, supra note 1, at 54. Professor Fessler suggests that misconduct that defeats the
public convenience, justifies wrong, commits fraud or defends crime is sufficient to
constitute the "big wrong" necessary to pierce the veil. Id. at 54 n.138.
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Many other states have experienced similar conflict in their veil-

piercing laws.'4 However, the conflict has been particularly pronounced
in Alaska, as the supreme court has shifted between the two doctrines
seven times between 1973 and 1987."5 This indecisiveness has
compounded the uncertainty common to veil-piercing jurisprudence. Such
irresolution may in 1 fact
impede business planning' 6 and also lead to
7
appeals.
unnecessary
Although the decisions are inconsistent and the emerging doctrine
unsettled, the decisions of the court can be harmonized to clarify the

current state of Alaska's veil-piercing jurisprudence.

This note will

demonstrate that the proper test for piercing the corporate veil in Alaska is
the disjunctive test, requiring a showing of either excessive control rising
to the level of instrumentality or misconduct in connection with the
corporate form. This construction of the doctrine is supported on three
grounds. First, the sources from which the Alaska doctrine was initially
derived and the way in which it has evolved indicate that the court
intentionally adopted a disjunctive test. Second, in all of the cases in
which the court has been faced with an outcome-determinative choice
between the tests, it has adopted the disjunctive test. Third, the way in
which the court examines the control prong inherently contemplates some

14. States have had varying degrees of success in clearly presenting their respective
doctrines regarding the conjunctive/disjunctive dichotomy. In most states, as in Alaska, the
issue arises when a court considers whether a showing of mere control will warrant
disregard of the corporate entity. See generally, PRESSER, supra note 6, §§ 2.00-.52, at 2-1
to 2-540 (including a survey of state-by-state piercing law that details most states' struggles
with this issue).
15. See Jackson v. General Electric Co., 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1973) (first adoption
of disjunctive test); Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977) (first shift; adoption of
conjunctive test); Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980) (affirming conjunctive
test); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980) (second shift;
return to disjunctive test), cert. denied, Klippan v. Volkswagen of America, 449 U.S. 974
(1980); General Constr. Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1981) (third
shift; return to conjunctive test suggested by decision); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646
P.2d 229 (Alaska 1982) (fourth shift; return to disjunctive test); Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon
& BlacklDawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982) (fifth shift; return to conjunctive test
suggested by decision); McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983) (sixth
shift; return to disjunctive test); Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities v. First Nat'l Bank, 685
P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1984) (affirming disjunctive test); Husky Oil N.P.R. Operations v. Sea
Airmotive, Inc., 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1986) (affirming disjunctive test); Klondike Indus.
v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987) (seventh shift; return to conjunctive test). See also
Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1990) (combining the two tests in a novel
approach).
16. Substantial control of a corporation by a parent or an individual shareholder might
subject the controlling party to liability notwithstanding the protection of the corporate veil.
17. See, e.g., Klondike Indus. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987); Eagle Air, Inc.
v. Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982). In both of these cases,
the defendant-corporations whose veils had been pierced based their appeals on contentions
that the conjunctive test, rather than the disjunctive test, should have been used, thus
requiring a higher showing by the plaintiff since both prongs of the test had to be satisfied.
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degree of incidental misuse, thereby eliminating the need for an additional
showing of misconduct.
This note focuses on the substantive veil-piercing decisions of the
Alaska Supreme Court. Certain cases addressing the veil-piercing issue
have been excluded as they either did not reach the merits of the question
of piercing" or involved unorthodox situations which are inapplicable to
the general piercing doctrine.' 9 Although the cases analyzed arise both
in the parent/subsidiary and individual shareholder/corporation contexts, the
situation under which the veil-piercing issue arises is not a dispositive
issue.2" Similarly, the fact that the piercing issue relates to a procedural
matter or sounds in tort or contract has no bearing on the ultimate judicial
decision of whether to disregard the corporate entity.2' The court has
never stated that differing contexts mandate different substantive treatment,

and it has applied the same two tests, albeit inconsistently, without regard
to such circumstances. Thus, the specific facts of the cases detailed herein
are only relevant to the inquiry insofar as they illustrate the breadth of the
situations in which the court will consider the piercing issue and insofar as

18. See Brock v. Alaska Int'l Indus., 645 P.2d 188 (Alaska 1982); Shepherd v. Bering
Sea Originals, 578 P.2d 587 (Alaska 1978).
19. See Croxton v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 817 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1991); State Dep't
of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp America, Inc., 674 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1983). Both of these cases
involved reverse-piercing or self-piercing, in which a corporation seeks to pierce its own
veil to treat otherwise separate entities as a single entity in order to minimize tax or similar
liability. The Alaska Supreme Court has manifested a reluctance to apply traditional
piercing doctrine in such cases, stating that "[w]e have never suggested that either of these
theories [(conjunctive or disjunctive)] is available to the corporation to pierce its own
corporate form." Id. at 465 n.9.
20. However, this distinction may tend to explain one shift by the court. See infra
notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
21. Some commentators have attempted to elicit.patterns from piercing cases across the
United States in order to predict the likelihood of a court's piercing the veil. See
Thompson, supra note 1, at 1058-60. No such patterns emerge from or are suggested by
the Alaska cases. See, e.g., Klondike Indus. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987)
(contract claim; shareholder/corporation; conjunctive test; pierce); Husky Oil N.P.R.
Operations v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1986) (contract claim; sibling
corporations; disjunctive test; pierce); Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities v. First Nat'l Bank,
685 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1984) (procedural/contract claim; parent/subsidiary; disjunctive test;
no pierce); McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983) (tort and contract
claims; parent/subsidiary; disjunctive test; pierce); Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon &
Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982) (contract claim; parent/subsidiary and
shareholder/corporation; conjunctive test; pierce); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d
229 (Alaska 1982) (contract claim; shareholder/corporation; disjunctive test; no pierce);
General Constr. Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1981) (contract claim;
parent/subsidiary; conjunctive test; no pierce); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH,
611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980) (contract claim; parent/subsidiary; disjunctive test; no pierce),
cert. denied, Klippan v. Volkswagen of America, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Bendix Corp. v.
Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980) (contract claim; parent/subsidiary; conjunctive test; no
pierce); Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977) (tort claim; shareholder/corporation;
conjunctive test; no pierce); Jackson v. General Electric Co., 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1973)
(tort claim; parent/subsidiary; disjunctive test; no pierce).
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they affect the manner in which the court applies the chosen test, whether
conjunctive or disjunctive.'
In sum, this examination will focus on theform of the tests used rather
than the substantive evidence which supports or opposes piercing under the
test ultimately chosen. Part II will detail the development of the doctrine
and the evolution of its two conflicting tests. Part Im will explain why the
argument in favor of the disjunctive test is more compelling.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE
A. The Disjunctive Test
The Supreme Court of Alaska first addressed the piercing issue in
Jackson v. General Electric Co.,' a case involving a tort claim of
defamation against a finance company and its parent corporation, an
electronics manufacturer. The plaintiff had defaulted on payments for
goods purchased from the parent corporation by means of credit provided
by the subsidiary and had subsequently received a defamatory collection
letter from the subsidiary. Unable to join the subsidiary as a defendant in
the action, the plaintiff sought judgment against the parent.
Justice Fitzgerald, writing for the court, noted one of the "wellrecognized exceptions" to the general principle of limited liability for
corporations. He stated that:
[A] parent corporation may be held liable for its subsidiary's conduct when
the parent uses a separate corporate form to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend crime. The parent corporation may
also be liable for the wrongful conduct of its subsidiary when the
subsidiary is the mere instrumentality of the parent.24

Thus, the veil-piercing doctrine was first presented as a disjunctive test
involving alternate inquiries into misconduct and control. In Jackson, the
plaintiff sought to prove excessive control by showing that the subsidiary

22. For example, the instrumentality prong entails an inquiry into either six or eleven
elements of control, depending upon the factual context. See infra text accompanying notes
26 & 62. The frequency with which these facts are determinative in resolving the piercing
issue is secondary to the issue of which test is employed. Such empirical analysis is
therefore beyond the scope of this examination. One empirical conclusion that can be
drawn is that the court will usually defer to the trial court's interpretation of the facts, as
evidenced by the fact that in only three of the cases detailed herein was the trial court
reversed, and the reversals were predicated on the lower court's misapplication or
nonapplication of the piercing doctrine.
23. 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1973).
24. Id. at 1172-73 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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was the "mere instrumentality" of the parent.'
In evaluating the
instrumentality question, the court looked at the eleven factors presented
by Professor Powell in his treatise on corporate law:
(a) The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the
subsidiary.
(b) The parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or
officers.
(c) The parent corporation finances the subsidiary.
(d) The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital stock of the
subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation.
(e) The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital.
(f) The parent corporation pays the salaries and other expenses or losses
of the subsidiary.
(g) The subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent
corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by the parent
corporation.
(h) In the papers of the parent corporation or the statements of its officers,
the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the parent
corporation, or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the
parent corporation's own.
(i) The parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary as its own.
(j) The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not act independently
in the interest of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent
corporation in the latter's interest.
(k) The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed.26
Though several cases have described the Jackson inquiry as
quantitative,27 the test as presented by the court was in fact qualitative,2
with the controlling principle and underlying policy being that "[a] parent
corporation which does not permit its subsidiary to exercise an individual
status may not expect that the subsidiary's independence will be recognized
elsewhere." 29 Since the Jackson court did not find the subsidiary to be
a "mere instrumentality,"3 and since it was not presented with the issue

25. l at 1173.

26. Id.(quoting FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORAIONS §§
5-6, at 9 (1931)).
27. See, e.g., Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69, 76 (Alaska 1990); General

Constr. Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d 981, 983 (Alaska 1981).
28. The court stated that "[i]t is not necessary... that all eleven of these factors be
found in order to conclude that the subsidiary is the mere instrument of its parent."
Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173.
29. Id.
30. The trial court's findings, affirmed by the supreme court, included the following:
the subsidiary's credit services rendered in connection with consumer financing for the
products of the parent constituted only one part of the subsidiary's operations; the advisory
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of misconduct, it affirmed the judgment of dismissal by the trial court and
declined to pierce the veil.3 '
B. The Conjunctive Test
The next decision that addressed the veil-piercing issue came four
years after Jackson. In Elliott v. Brown,32 the plaintiffs, who had
previously won a criminal case against their supervisor for assault,
attempted to use the supervisor's guilty plea as an admission of liability in
the subsequent intentional tort case. Seeking a deeper pocket, the plaintiffs
sought judgment against the corporation rather than the supervisor, based
on the fact that the supervisor was a fifty percent shareholder in the
corporation. IBecause workers' compensation provided a defense to claims
of vicarious liability, the plaintiffs sought to pierce the veil and recover
from the corporation for the supervisor's torts. In evaluating the claim, the
court held that "[t]he corporate veil may not be pierced merely because [the
shareholder] ... controls the activities of the corporation. Rather, the veil
may be pierced only if the corporate form is used 'to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend crime.' 33 The court
cited the misconduct prong of Jackson'sdisjunctive test. Nevertheless, by
indicating that the misconduct inquiry was always necessary, the court
imposed a conjunctive test: 'This doctrine requires considerably more than
mere control; it exists to prevent a party from obtaining an advantage
through deceptive or manipulative conduct." 34 Absent evidence of such
misconduct, the court curtailed its examination of control and affirmed that
portion of the trial court's opinion refusing to disregard the corporate
35
entity.

services rendered by the parent were paid for by the subsidiary; the subsidiary was not
disadvantaged in any way by the parent corporation; the creditors of the subsidiary were not
threatened; there was no use of the subsidiary's property by the parent; and the parent did
not pay the salaries of the employees of the subsidiary. Nevertheless, control amounting
to instrumentality was suggested by the following: the corporations filed consolidated
income tax returns; there were common officers and directors; and the earnings of the
subsidiary were included in the financial reports of the parent. Id. at 1172, 1174. The court
indicated that based upon these facts, if the trial court had found that the subsidiary was a
mere instrumentality, a decision to pierce the veil under a disjunctive test could have been
affirmed. Id at 1174.
31. Id at 1173-74.
32. 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).
33. Id at 1326 (quoting Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1172-73).
34. Id.
35. Id
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C. Competing Tests
In the decade following the Elliott decision, the court made several
shifts in articulating the proper test to be used in deciding whether to pierce
the veil. Throughout this period, neither the circumstance
(parent/subsidiary or individual shareholder/corporation) nor the cause of
action was decisive in the court's determination. Furthermore, while the
court occasionally used the language of "priority" and of a "combined"
test, a dichotomy between the conjunctive and disjunctive tests essentially
remained.
Although Elliott addressed the piercing issue within the context of the
individual shareholder/corporation situation rather than the
parent/subsidiary context addressed in Jackson, the court soon after applied
the conjunctive test to the latter relationship as well. In Bendix Corp. v.
Adams,36 the plaintiffs asserted a breach of contract claim against a
subsidiary and its parent on an instrumentality theory, citing the control
prong of Jackson. 7 The court, however, disregarded the control inquiry
because, under the conjunctive test that it used, the absence of "deceptive
or manipulative conduct" precluded any decision to pierce the veil. s The
court used language indicating a prioritization of the two prongs: "[M]ore
important than the quantitative [instrumentality] approach ...is the fact
that there was no suggestion that [the subsidiary] ...was created 'to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend crime."'3 9
The court recognized the possibility that the subsidiary was to a certain
degree an instrumentality of the parent but dismissed the plaintiff's
allegations of excessive control, noting that the subsidiary's mere existence
did not denote misconduct. This analysis proved dispositive of the piercing
issue.4° In essence, the court imposed a conjunctive test.4 The court

36. 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
37. Id.at 32.
38. Id.
39. Id (quoting Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1172-73).
40. Id
41. The conceivable options of interpreting the priority language are (a) that the
priority, in effect, imposes a conjunctive test, as detailed in the text accompanying this
footnote or (b) that priority only means that, in the disjunctive test, the misconduct prong
should be the initial focus of the court's examination but should not be dispositive of the
piercing question since excessive control may still be demonstrated.
The court's analysis in Bendix indicates that the former, or conjunctive, construction
is probably being used. In Bendix, the court mistakenly combined the plaintiff's
instrumentality and agency claims. Id at 32 n.14. Since the plaintiff had failed to prove
any agency, the trial court implied that there was no instrumentality. The court's inquiry
into agency did not resemble the traditional control inquiry, however. That the trial court
did not consider control in the manner established by precedent indicates that the absence
of misconduct was indeed dispositive. Id at 32-33.
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cited the principle and policy behind the conjunctive test presented in
Elliott,42 noting that control by itself was insufficient to pierce the veil,
because some degree of control is a normal expectation in the
parent/subsidiary relationship. 3
In the same year that Bendix was decided, however, the court returned
to the disjunctive test. This departure from Bendix occurred in
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GrnbH,4 which involved a breach of
contract claim brought by a parent automobile manufacturer and its
subsidiary importer against a manufacturer that supplied component
seatbelts for plaintiffs' automobiles. The defendant asserted as a defense
a forum selection clause in its contract with the subsidiary and sought to
pierce the veil to bind the parent to the contract. The court explicitly
adopted the disjunctive test of Jackson as determinative of "the limited
45
circumstances which do warrant 'piercing the corporate veil."'
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rabinowitz, writing for the court, reiterated
46
Professor Powell's eleven factors for examining the control issue.
47
Because the evidence did not warrant a finding of mere instrumentality,
the court affirmed the trial court's judgment and again declined' to pierce
the veil.48 Ironically, the court cited Elliott and Bendix but made no
reference to the fact that those cases employed a different test. 49
The court made a tentative return to the conjunctive test in General
Construction Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc." General Constructioninvolved
a disputed contract between the defendant and a construction company.
The defendant subsequently contracted with a subsidiary of the

Nevertheless, the fact that the court addressed both control and misconduct might
indicate that the priority analysis is merely an ordering principle of the disjunctive test. The
issue of which alternative is the proper construction of the priority inquiry is unimportant,
however, since it is clear that the court has struggled with the issue and has construed such
priority as effectively imposing a conjunctive test. See Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon &
Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982).
42. See supra text accompanying note 34.
43. "It is to be expected that a subsidiary will be controlled by its parent, otherwise it
would have little reason for creating it." Bendix, 610 P.2d at 37 (quoting 6 ZOLMAN
CAvrrcH, BusINEsS ORGANIZATIONS § 120.05[2][b] (1979)).
44. 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, Klippan v. Volkswagen of America, 449
U.S. 974 (1980).
45. Volkswagenwerk, 611 P.2d at 505.
46. IdMat 506 n.12. See supra text accompanying note 26.
47. The court was presented with evidence showing that the parent and subsidiary
corporations had separate contracts and records, that they owned property in their own
names, and "in short carrie[d] on business as ...separate entit[ies]." Volkswagenwerk, 611
P.2d at 506.
48. Id.
49. IaM
50. 629 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1981).
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construction company for completion of the job. The defendant refused to
pay the subsidiary, and the subsidiary sued the defendant for breach of the
second contract. The trial court found substantial performance by the
subsidiary and rendered judgment accordingly. The defendant appealed,
seeking to pierce the veil of the subsidiary and bind the subsidiary to the
original contract between the defendant and the parent corporation. 5
The court appeared to impose a conjunctive test, emphasizing that the
.Jacksonfactors relating to instrumentality were of "secondary importance"

to the misconduct inquiry.52

Because there was no showing of

misconduct and an "insufficient showing of interrelatedness, 53 the court4
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and refused to pierce the veil.'
However, the force of the argument for a conjunctive test was limited by
the court's detailed explanation of the disjunctive test and its thorough
examination of both control and misconduct.55 Again, it was unclear
exactly what was meant by the priority the court gave to the misconduct
inquiry.56 The opinion in General Constructionclearly demonstrated that
the court was either confused about or unaware of the dichotomy that
existed in the prior piercing cases.
The court again applied the disjunctive test in Uchitel Co. v. Telephone
CoY Although Uchitel reflected a forceful return to the disjunctive
test, s the decision was not free from inconsistency. Uchitel involved a

51. lt at 982.
52. ld.
at 983 (citing Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980)).
53. Id. The trial court was presented with evidence showing that the parent corporation
owned 50 percent of the stock of the subsidiary, there were common officers and directors,
and the parent provided some financing to the subsidiary. As evidence against
instrumentality, there was no showing that the parent had caused the incorporation of the
subsidiary. Also, the subsidiary was not undercapitalized and the parent did not pay the
salaries, use the property or commingle records with the subsidiary. Id. at 983-84.
54. 1& at 983, 985.
55. The court stated that "no contention is made that [the parent] . . .used [the
subsidiary] ... to defeat public policy or perpetrate a wrong or fraud or crime. Moreover,
under the quantitative approach suggested in Jackson, there is an insufficient showing of
interrelatedness." Id at 983. The court continued by examining the facts of the case in
light of the factors presented by Professor Powell. Id at 983-84. See supra text
accompanying note 26.
56. If the court had indeed adopted a strict conjunctive test, both the court's
instrumentality inquiry and the examination of the instrumentality doctrine as presented in
Jackson would have been unnecessary once the court had found that there was no
misconduct. On the other hand, the court may have interpreted the priority as guiding, but
not determinative of, the piercing issue. If the court had meant that there was a disjunctive
test which merely placed emphasis on the abuse prong as detailed in the first option
presented supra note 41, then the court's reliance on Bendix would be misplaced.
57. 646 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1982).
58. Professor Fessler argues that "[i]n Uchitel, after spending nearly a decade pondering
an ill-defined area of the law, the court found terminology and criteria with which it was
comfortable. It preferred the 'quantitative approach"' of the disjunctive test initially
announced in Jackson in evaluating veil-piercing claims. Fessler, supra note 1, at 57.
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contract dispute between a corporation and a telephone company. The
plaintiff telephone company sought to hold the sole shareholder of the
corporation personally liable for the corporation's breach of contract.
Although the court adopted a disjunctive test, it recognized its previous
holdings in Elliott and Bendix which indicated the propriety of a
conjunctive test.5 9 The Uchitel court's holding reaffirmed its willingness
to pierce the corporate veil under the control prong where "the subsidiary
is the mere instrumentality of the parent... [and] 'the two corporations are
so closely intertwined that they do not merit treatment as separate
entities." '6° Ironically, the court cited General Construction in support
of the disjunctive test and a court's ability to pierce the veil on a showing
of only excessive control.6 That this inconsistency was not noted by the
court either in Uchitel or in later decisions indicates the court's nonrecognition of either the conjunctive/disjunctive dichotomy or the
ambiguity of the priority language as utilized by the court.
In Uchitel, the court adapted and condensed Professor Powell's eleven
factors of instrumentality in the parent/subsidiary context to six factors in
the individual shareholder/corporation context:
(a) whether the shareholder sought to be charged owns all or most of the
stock of the corporation;
(b) whether the shareholder has subscribed to all of the capital stock of the
corporation or otherwise caused its incorporation;
(c) whether the corporation has grossly inadequate capital;
(d) whether the shareholder uses the property of the corporation as his
own;
(e) whether the directors or executives of the corporation act independently
in the interest of the corporation or simply take their orders from the
shareholder in the latter's interest;
(f) whether the formal legal requirements of the corporation are
observed.'
The court directly adopted Professor Powell's original language,
eliminating those portions of the inquiry that were particular to the
parent/subsidiary relationship.63 Since the court found no evidence of
misconduct or instrumentality' under the adapted criteria, it declined to

59. Uchitel, 646 P.2d at 234 n.12.
60. Id at 23,4 (quoting Jackson v. General Electric Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska

1973)).

61. Id.
62. Id at 235.
63. See supra text accompanying note 26.
64. Other than the defendant being the sole shareholder of the company, the court found
none of the six factors in the adapted instrumentality inquiry. Uchitel, 646 P.2d at 234-35.

1992]

PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

pierce the veil, and reversed and vacated the trial court's judgment which
65
held the shareholder personally liable for the breach by the corporation.
The first case in which the Alaska Supreme Court actually pierced the
veil was Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co. 6 In Eagle
Air, the court again shifted from the seemingly settled disjunctive test to a
hesitant adoption of the conjunctive test. Eagle Air involved a claim of
breach of contract arising in both the individual shareholder/corporation
context and the parent/subsidiary context. The plaintiff insured a company
that was purchased by a corporation of which the defendant owned 998 of
1000 shares. The plaintiff sought to collect premium payments in arrears,
but the insured company, at that point a subsidiary of defendant's
corporation, had been stripped of its assets by the parent corporation and
its controlling shareholder. The plaintiff thus sought to pierce the veil of
the insured subsidiary and hold the parent and the shareholder liable for the
amount in default. The trial court found that control amounting to
instrumentality existed under both the Jackson and Uchitel inquiries.67
On appeal, however, the defendant asserted that a finding of mere
control was insufficient to pierce the veil and urged the court to adopt a
conjunctive test under which an "additional element of fraud or
wrongdoing must be shown before liability can attach."'
The court
apparently agreed with the defendant's approach, finding support in
General Construction and Bendix, again "relegat[ing] the 'quantitative'
[instrumentality] approach to secondary importance., 69 The court
nevertheless affirmed the trial court's decision to pierce the veil based on
defendant's misconduct in stripping the subsidiary of its assets." Once
again, the effect of prioritizing the misconduct inquiry over the control
inquiry was ambiguous. It was also unclear whether the court was truly
adopting a conjunctive test or whether it was merely pointing out that the
defendant's contention on appeal was not outcome-determinative.
Following Eagle Air, the court returned to the disjunctive test in
McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co.7 This case ushered in the longest period

65. Id. at 235.
66. 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982).
67. Id. at 1003-04. In addition to the stock ownership, the trial court found that the
defendant was the president and director of the defendant corporation, that the defendant
corporation leased helicopters to the acquired subsidiary through another of its subsidiaries,
and that the defendant was president, manager and director of the acquired subsidiary. Id.
at 1002. These findings, and the ultimate conclusion that control existed, were not
challenged by the defendants on appeal. Id. at 1004.
68. Id. at 1004 (footnote omitted).
69. ld
70. Id at 1005.
71. 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983).
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of consistency in Alaska's veil-piercing doctrine. McKibben involved a
joint venture between the assignee of a mining lease and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the defendant corporation. The plaintiff-lessor sought to
collect unpaid royalties from the subsidiary, which was liable as a coventurer under the lease. In affirming summary judgment for the lessor,
the court pierced the veil of the parent corporation.72 The McKibben
court clearly adopted the disjunctive test:
Two theories may be used to justify disregarding the corporate status of a
subsidiary. First, a parent corporation may be held liable for the wrongful
conduct of its subsidiary when the parent uses a separate corporate form
"to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud, or defend
crime." 73 Second, a parent corporation may be held liable on the
alternative theory that the subsidiary is the mere instrumentality of the
parent. 74
The opinion, written by Chief Justice Burke, restated the eleven factors
included in the instrumentality inquiry and evaluated the plaintiff's claim
based upon those factors.7' The court found that the record contained
evidence that "sufficiently established . . . mere instrumentality" 76 and,
notwithstanding the absence of any additional misconduct, affirmed the
trial court's judgment to pierce the veil.77
In Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities v. First National Bank,78 a bank
sought to pierce the veil in the procedural context of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over a foreign parent corporation whose subsidiary had
defaulted on loan payments. In analyzing the piercing issue, the court
reiterated the eleven-point instrumentality inquiry from Jackson.79
Finding that the plaintiff had "not listed facts which would meet the tests
of corporate alter ego,"' the court declined to pierce the veil, setting aside

72. Id.at 1231.
73. Id. at 1229 (quoting Jackson v. General Electric Co., 514 P.2d 1170, 1172-73
(Alaska 1973)).
74. 1L (emphasis added) (citing Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Alaska 1977);
Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229, 234 (Alaska 1982)) (other citations omitted).
75. Id at 1230.
76. A The trial court found that the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary
and had financed and owned all the capital of the subsidiary, that the officers and directors
were the same in both corporations, that the subsidiary was undercapitalized and had no
employees or assets other than those acquired from the parent corporation, that there was
extensive commingling of offices and records, and that the parent corporation used the
assets of the subsidiary. IA
77. Id. at 1230-31.
78. 685 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1984).
79. l at 1240-41 n.9.
80. Id. The court found that the parent corporation owned all the capital stock of the
subsidiary and that there was a common officer, but failed to find any other evidence
pointing to instrumentality. That the court used the term "alter ego" instead of
"instrumentality" or "control" is not an issue. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying
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the trial court's default judgment against the parent corporation.8 ' No
allegation of misconduct was made nor was the issue addressed by the
court. Thus, the court appeared to consider the piercing issue on
instrumentality grounds only, essentially applying the disjunctive test under
which a showing of excessive control would have been sufficient to pierce
the veil.
In Husky Oil N.P.R. Operations v. Sea Airmotive, Inc.,82 a case
involving a contract dispute, the court addressed the piercing issue in a
similar manner. The plaintiff sought to pierce the veil of a sibling
corporation of the contracting entity. Referring only to the instrumentality
doctrine, the court extended Jackson to the sibling corporation context and
concluded that the sibling corporation was the mere instrumentality of the
contracting entity.83 On this basis, the court pierced the veil, reversing the
trial court's denial of summary judgment on that issue. 8a As in
Kennecorp, no reference was made to any misconduct prong, thereby
indicating the propriety of the disjunctive test.
Though the court appeared to have settled on the propriety of the
disjunctive test, it abandoned its five years of consistency in Klondike
Industries v. Gibson.5 In Klondike Industries,the plaintiff sought to hold
the defendant personally liable for breach of contract by a corporation
which was wholly owned by the defendant. The court referred only to
Eagle Air, interpreting that decision to hold that "a shareholder could be
held personally liable for a corporate obligation if he controlled the
corporation (as determined by six control factors [from Uchitel]) and used
the corporate form 'to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit
fraud or defend crime.' 8 6 Conceding control, the shareholder defended
against only the misconduct allegations. 7 Since the court found
prejudicial action that implicitly satisfied the misconduct prong, it affirmed
the trial court's judgment to pierce the veil and hold the shareholder

text.
81. Kennecorp, 685 P.2d at 1240-42.
82. 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1986).
83. The trial court noted that the plaintiff's audit of the defendant revealed that the
president of the parent owned 96 percent of the subsidiary's stock, the subsidiary had no
equipment or personnel related to its proffered business purpose (fuel distribution), and the
subsidiary had no income. d at 533.
84. IM at 534.
85. 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987).
86. Id at 1171 (emphasis added) (referring to the control factors put forth in Uchitel
Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1982)).
87. Id. At trial, the court had found that the defendant had formed a corporation with
himself as the sole shareholder and had used the funds of the corporation for his own
purposes. Id.at 1162.
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personally liable.8 8 As in Eagle Air, it is unclear whether the court was
forcefully advancing the conjunctive test as the correct test or whether the
court was merely pointing out that the defendant's actions did, in fact,
prejudice the plaintiffs so as to constitute misconduct. Once again,
reference to any of the original precedents or to the ensuing dichotomy
between the tests is conspicuously absent from the opinion.
The veil-piercing doctrine in Alaska remains unsettled, as evidenced
by the court's most recent consideration of the piercing issue. In Murat v.
F/V Shelikof Strait,9 the instrumentality and misconduct inquiries
appeared in the familiar language of priority. The court suggested,
however, that the tests were actually combined. The court found that the
instrumentality test was the proper tool to inquire into the "primary" issue
of misconduct.' In Murat, the defendant close corporation had suffered
a default judgment in an action for breach of contract. The plaintiff sought
to hold the shareholders personally liable for the amount in default and
obtained summary judgment piercing the veil. 91 On appeal, the court
used the instrumentality inquiry to examine the misconduct issue:
[The primary consideration in determining whether to "pierce the
corporate veil" is whether the corporate form has been abused by the
person sought to be charged; that is, whether the corporate entity was used
"to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud or defend
crime." In determining whether there has been an abuse of the corporate
form sufficient to justify a disregard of the protective "veil" in the
shareholder-corporation context, this court has approved a "quantitative
approach," under which the [Uchitel] ... factors are to be considered by
the court.9

Finding the existence of a genuine issue of fact in the piercing inquiry, the
court remanded the case. 93
The combined inquiry presented in Murat essentially operates as a
conjunctive test. 4 In the end, a successful plaintiff will have shown both
instrumentality and wrongdoing amounting to the traditional misconduct

88. Id at 1171-72.
89. 793 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1990).
90. Id. at 76.
91. Id at 72.
92. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
93. Id at 76-79. Although the court did not conclusively address the control issue, it
indicated that causing incorporation was not particularly indicative of instrumentality and
that, while undercapitalization was more probative, it alone was insufficient to pierce the
veil. Id at 77-78.
94. Ironically, however, the Muratcourt cites McKibben and the disjunctive test with
approval, stating that "summary judgment on [the] 'mere instrumentality' issue [is]
appropriate where virtually every factor was indicated on the undisputed evidence." Id. at
79 n.20.
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under the second prong of the conjunctive test -- that which defeats the
public convenience, justifies wrong, commits fraud or defends crime.

III. PROPRiETY OF THE DISJUNCTIVE TEST
The sources and evolution of Alaska's veil-piercing doctrine, combined
with the choices made by the court when faced with an outcomedeterminative decision indicate that the disjunctive test is the proper
approach in considering whether to pierce the corporate veil in Alaska.
This conclusion is strengthened by the necessary and inherent overlap of
the control and misconduct prongs of the disjunctive test.
A. Sources of the Doctrine
The manner in which the Alaska Supreme Court utilized precedent in
deciding Jackson v. General Electric Co.95 indicates that the court
intended to adopt a disjunctive test in determining whether to pierce the
veil of limited liability for corporations. Furthermore, the sources from
which the control prong and the misconduct prong were derived indicate
that satisfaction of either prong is sufficient to pierce the veil.
The original language of the misconduct prong derives from the rule
"that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity... ; but, when the
notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons." 96 Since the rule makes no reference to a required
inquiry into a threshold level of control, the rule appears to provide that
misconduct in conjunction with the legal entity97 is alone sufficient to
warrant piercing the veil.98 Consequently, in Jackson, the Alaska

95. 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1973).
96. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1905). While the terms describing the misconduct inquiry originate from Milwaukee
Refrigerator,the Jackson court cited Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d
157, 160 (7th Cir. 1963), as the source of the language. Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173 n.7.
97. For example, such misconduct might involve the "use[ [of] a separate corporate
form to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit fraud or defend crime." Jackson,
514 P.2d at 1172-73. Fraud, crime or other wrong that is not connected to the corporate
form has never been deemed a proper circumstance for disregarding the corporate entity.
98. Milwaukee Refrigerator is not dispositive of the conjunctive/disjunctive issue.
While the case plainly turns on the question of misconduct, the significance of control is
unclear. At the time Milwaukee Refrigeratorwas decided, the United States Supreme Court
had not yet presented a coherent instrumentality doctrine. Following its consideration of
the misconduct issue, the circuit court pointed out that "it clearly appears that the [parent]
shipper practically controls the [subsidiary] transit company . .. [and that] the transit
company is a mere separate name for the brewing company, being in fact the same
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Supreme Court adopted the misconduct rule as one of two prongs of a
disjunctive test, either of which could stand alone to warrant piercing the
veil.
The source of the control prong further suggests that a disjunctive test
is proper. The classic idea of "instrumentality" did not involve a direct
inquiry into wrongdoing. The first use of such language by the United
99
States Supreme Court appears in United States v. Reading Co.:
[W]here such ownership of stock is resorted to, not for the purpose of
participating in the affairs of the corporation in which it is held in a
manner normal and usual with stockholders, but for the purpose of making
it a mere agent, or instrumentality of another company ...the courts will
look through the forms to the realities of the relation between the
companies as if the corporate agency did not exist and will deal with them
as the justice of the case may require.' 00
Thus, the concept of instrumentality emerged as an independent method for
piercing the veil, not requiring a formal showing of additional misconduct.
The Jackson court appeared to adopt Professor Powell's analysis of
instrumentality as its own. 10' However, an examination of Powell's work
clearly demonstrates its inconsistency with the approach adopted in Alaska.
Powell's test is itself a conjunctive test under which a party wishing to
disregard the corporate entity must satisfy a three-part test: "(1) Control
([per the] Instrumentality Rule)... (2) [d]efendant's fraud or wrong with
respect to the complainant.. . [and] (3) [u]njust loss or injury to the
complainant."'"m The first element of control is evaluated under the
eleven-point inquiry adopted by the Jackson court."13 Under Powell's
analysis, the second element of misconduct is also necessary to pierce the
veil: "[P]roof must show not only an excessive control over the subsidiary
but the actual exercise of that control in such a manner as to defraud or
wrong the complainant."' ' 4 The third element would naturally be present
in any tort or contract claim.
It therefore appears that the Jackson court consciously declined to
adopt the conjunctive elements of the Powell test. Rather, the court opted
collection of persons and interests." Milwaukee Refrigerator, 142 F. at 256. It is unclear
whether this discussion of control arose as part of the misconduct inquiry in connection with
the corporate form or whether it constituted a separate concern. The court indicated that
there was a sufficient showing on both the grounds of control and misconduct, thereby
leaving open the question of what would have happened if one prong had not been satisfied.
99. 253 U.S. 26 (1920). The Jackson court did not refer to this case. It appears herein
as historical background for the principle.
100. Id at 62-63 (emphasis added).
101. Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173. See supra text accompanying note 26.
102. POWELL, supra note 26, § 3, at 4-6.
103. See supra text accompanying note 26.
104. POWELL, supra note 26, § 12, at 40.
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to use Powell's eleven factors to guide only the control prong of its own
disjunctive inquiry. Additional support for this proposition can be found
0 5s
in the court's reference to Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aeronautical Corp.,
which employed a conjunctive test to pierce the veil.e The Jackson
decision indicates that the court was aware that the conjunctive test
originally presented by Professor Powell and adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in Steven had been "quoted approvingly by the courts,"0' yet it
declined to adopt the conjunctive strictures of the tests as they existed in
the original sources.
Professor Presser agrees that the court consciously adapted and adopted
the disjunctive test:
Powell had used the "mere instrumentality" factor as only one of three that
had to be present before he thought the veil ought to be pierced.... By
allowing the veil to be pierced when only one of Powell's three factors was
present,... the Alaska court seems to have greatly liberalized Powell's
approach.l"'
Indeed, such a liberal piercing law has positive policy implications that
may have influenced the court to plant "the seeds of . . . plaintiff

victories."'" For example, proving unfair or inequitable conduct can be
costly and difficult. ° A liberal doctrine would serve to alleviate this
problem. It would also help curb the general problem of excessive control,
where such control "impair[s] the interests of other parties by carrying this
unity of interest too far.""'
It is noteworthy that none of the decisions employing a conjunctive test
ever referred to the fact that Powell's original standard was itself
conjunctive. If the court had meant to assert such a test, it could have

105. 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963). See supra note 96.
106. Steven, 324 F.2d 157. The Seventh Circuit held that:
In order to establish that a subsidiary is the mere instrumentality of its parent, three
elements must be proved: control by the parent to such a degree that the subsidiary
has become its mere instrumentality; fraud or wrong by the parent through its
subsidiary, e.g., torts, violation of a statute or stripping the subsidiary of its assets;
and unjust loss or injury to the claimant, such as insolvency of the subsidiary.
IL at 160 (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, POWELL, supra note 26, § 3, at 4-6). Thus,
the Steven court gave Powell's analysis the construction that the Alaska Supreme Court
would have given it had the court desired to establish a conjunctive test.
107. Jackson, 514 P.2d at 1173 n.9.
108. PREsSER, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-7 to 2-8 (footnotes omitted). Professor Presser
was referring to the court's opinion in McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223, 1230
(Alaska 1983), where the court presented Professor Powell's eleven-point inquiry but cited
only Jackson. Nevertheless, Professor Presser's observation with respect to the return to the
disjunctive test in McKibben is applicable to all of Alaska's veil-piercing decisions.
109. Fessler, supra note 1, at 57.
110. Clark, supra note 3, at 543.
111. David H. Barber, Piercingthe CorporateVeil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 371 (1981),
reprinted in 23 CORPORATE PRACrncE COMMENTATOR 610, 618 (1982).
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referred to Powell's original conjunctive standard, literally interpreted, as
compelling support for the change in the Alaska piercing test. Yet the
court has not done so, and its departure from the initial test put forth in
Jackson raises questions as to its rationale.
One reason for the court's apparent confusion could be the context in
which Elliott arose. Elliott involved an individual shareholder/corporation
situation rather than the parent/subsidiary situation present in Jackson.
While there is no discernible pattern in the ensuing application of the tests
with regard to the context in which the cases arise, the Elliott court,
perhaps as a result of the different factual context, used the term "alter
ego" instead of "mere instrumentality."112 One earlier federal case t1 3
in Alaska had also used "alter ego" as the proper inquiry in the individual
shareholder/corporation context. 4 While Professor Powell did not
believe there was a practical difference between the concepts of alter ego
and instrumentality,"' the language of "alter ego" may have originally
referred to a conjunctive standard.116 That Elliott was never
distinguished in later cases based upon the language or the context suggests
that the Alaska Supreme Court may not have recognized the
conjunctive/disjunctive dichotomy, and may simply have unintentionally
abandoned its holding in Jackson.
The adoption of the disjunctive test was supported by the independent
corporate misconduct and instrumentality doctrines as they existed prior to
Alaska's first impression. Furthermore, the fact that the court did not refer
to the dichotomy between the tests presented in Jackson and Elliott
indicates that it was unaware of the substantive change it was making in
the veil-piercing doctrine when it made the Elliott departure.

112. Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Alaska 1977).
113. Hoss v. Purinton, 229 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956).
114. See Bruce Eric Dizenfeld, Note, Close Corporations in Alaska, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA
L. REV. 123, 161-65 (1977).
115. POWELL, supranote 26, § 3, at 4 (classifying "mere instrumentality" and "alter ego"
as equivalent terms, both connoting "control of the subsidiary by the parent corporation").
116. BLuMBEPG, supra note 6, § 6.03, at 118.
"[P]iercing the veil" is proper when (1) such unity of ownership and interest exist
that the two affiliated corporations have ceased to be separate and the subsidiary has
been relegated to the status of "alter ego" of the parent; and (2) where recognition
of them as separate entities would sanction fraud or lead to an inequitable result.
Id. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the term "alter ego"
on an appeal from the District Court of the District of Alaska in Hoss, 229 F.2d at 108,
indicates that this is probably not the case. The interpretation given to the term in Hoss
would support the adoption of a disjunctive standard insofar as the Ninth Circuit employed
an instrumentality-type inquiry to determine whether the corporation was a "mere conduit"
for the activities of its shareholders, without any additional inquiry into misconduct. Hoss,
229 F.2d at 108.
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B. Evolution of the Doctrine
The court's decision in Bendix Corp. v. Adams" 7 indicated the
nebulous nature of the piercing doctrine in the wake of the Elliott decision.
While Justice Boochever advanced a conjunctive test in Bendix, the test
was not put forth in the straightforward language of Elliott,"8 but rather
in the elusive language of priority that may or may not, in fact, be
tantamount to a conjunctive test."9 The remainder of the Alaska cases
adopting the conjunctive test manifest the same hesitation found in the
Bendix decision insofar as they refer to prioritization of the misconduct and
control prongs
but do not strictly require a conjunctive test, as the court did
2
in Elliott.10
On the other hand, the decisions reaffirming the disjunctive test have
been more firm in their assertions. The disjunctive test was consciously
adapted to the individual shareholder/corporation context in Uchitel Co. v.
Telephone Co.'
Furthermore, the disjunctive test enjoyed the longest
period of consistent acceptance, as demonstrated by the court's decisions
in McKibben v. Mohawk Oil Co., 2 Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities v.
First National Bank,123 and Husky Oil N.P.R. Operations v. Sea
Airmotive, Inc 24
Thus, the evolution of the piercing doctrine indicates that once the
initial tests were formulated, the court shifted strongly toward the
disjunctive test. In contrast, the court made only tentative pronouncements
of the conjunctive test insofar as those decisions referred to priority. Even
in these cases, the court acknowledged that there had been alternative tests,
which constituted a disjunctive standard, in some prior holdings.

117. 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
118. See Elliott, 569 P.2d at 1326 (stating that "[tihis doctrine requires considerably

more than mere control"). While the court cites this passage in Bendix, 610 P.2d at 32, it
does not embrace the language of Elliott in its holding.
119. See supranote 41. In the language employed by the Bendix court ("more important
than the quantitative approach [(instrumentality)] ... is the fact that there is no suggestion
[of misconduct] anywhere in the record"), it is unclear whether the absence of misconduct
completely precludes any finding to pierce the veil, as it would under a conjunctive test.
Bendix, 610 P.2d at 32.
120. See Klondike Indus. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161, 1171 (Alaska 1987) (making no
reference to Bendix but following Eagle Air strictly, thus implicitly adopting such
prioritization); Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000, 1004
(Alaska 1982); General Constr. Co. v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d 981, 983 (Alaska
1981). See also supra note 41 for further discussion of the court's use of "priority"
language.
121. 646 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1982).
122. 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983).
123. 685 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1984).
124. 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1986).
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C. Making Meaningful Choices
Further evidence that the disjunctive test is the proper test derives from
the fact that in each instance where the court was presented with an
outcome-determinative situation in which the resolution of the veil-piercing
issue would be different depending upon the test used, it selected the
disjunctive standard. In the majority of cases, the court found neither
excessive control nor misconduct."z A court applying either the
conjunctive or the disjunctive test would have declined to pierce the veil
in those instances. Likewise, in those cases where both misconduct and
control amounting to instrumentality were found,126 the court would have
pierced the veil under either test. However, in each instance where only

instrumentality was present and misconduct was either absent or not at
issue, the court adopted the disjunctive test, thereby allowing the court to
pierce the veil."2 This supports Professor Presser's theory that the
Alaska Supreme Court desires a liberal piercing policy."'
D. Instrumentality Includes Misconduct
129
Justice Boochever, writing for the court in Bendix Corp. v. Adams,
recognized the potential overbreadth of a liberal (disjunctive) test that
required only a showing of instrumentality; control is a normal expectation

125. In some cases, the court did not address the misconduct issue. See Kennecorp
Mortgage & Equities v. First Nat'l Bank, 685 P.2d 1232 (Alaska 1984) (finding no
instrumentality; misconduct not at issue); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co., 646 P.2d 229
(Alaska 1982) (finding neither instrumentality nor misconduct); General Constr. Co. v.
Tyonek Timber, Inc., 629 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1981) (finding no instrumentality; misconduct
not at issue); Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1980)
(finding no instrumentality; misconduct not at issue), cert. denied, Klippan v. Volkswagen
of America, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Bendix Corp. v. Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980)
(finding neither agency/instrumentality nor misconduct); Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323
(Alaska 1977) (finding neither instrumentality nor misconduct).
126. See Klondike Indus. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1987) (piercing veil where
defendant conceded instrumentality and court found misconduct); Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon
& Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1982) (finding both instrumentality and
misconduct, and piercing the veil).
127. See Husky Oil N.P.R. Operations v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska
1986) (piercing veil upon finding of control; misconduct not at issue); McKibben v.
Mohawk Oil Co., 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983) (piercing veil upon finding of control
without misconduct). Similarly, in Jackson v. General Electric Co., 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska
1973), the court did not consider the misconduct issue. With regard to the instrumentality
issue, it did not find excessive control. The court recognized that had the trial court in fact
found control amounting to the level of instrumentality, "an opposite result could
conceivably have been reached" that would pierce the veil under the disjunctive test only.
Id. at 1174.
128. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
129. 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980).
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in the parent/subsidiary relationship and an important aspect of the
corporate form. 130 Similarly, some control is necessarily attendant to the
individual shareholder/corporation relationship in a close corporation.
Professor Presser has criticized Alaska's liberalization as "inconsistent with
traditional piercing the veil learning . . . [and] economically
inefficient,"' M noting that such liberalization
may... seriously undercut the policy of encouraging use of the corporate
form, by providing a means for piercing the veil when contract creditors
might have been fully knowledgeable about the "mere instrumentality"
nature of a subsidiary, and still chosen to contract with the subsidiary on
that basis.' 32
Indeed, many of the Powell factors may be present in the normal corporate
existence, potentially imposing liability upon entities or persons who were
merely shareholders of corporations evidencing a few of the Powell factors.
Essentially, such liberalization could threaten the fundamental corporate
principle of limited liability, thereby eliminating a major incentive to
incorporate.
The application of the disjunctive test is unlikely to cause such
consequences, however, since a showing of instrumentality necessarily
involves a degree of corporate misconduct. The disjunctive test, as applied
by the Alaska Supreme Court, includes an inquiry into corporate
wrongdoing through either the formal misconduct prong or through the
control inquiry. Although the eleven-point inquiry of the control prong
does not directly address corporate misconduct, it does serve to uncover
corporate misconduct.3 3 The Powell inquiry assists the court in
characterizing the actions of the corporation and in deciding whether
corporate control is for proper purposes. Professor Clark has noted the
propriety of requiring some indicator of misuse where the court pierces the
veil based solely upon a finding of excessive control:
[T]he court may find that random instances of self-dealing and
mismanagement, in the context of the shareholder's failure to keep
corporate books and observe corporate formalities, his or its mingling of
corporate and personal (or parent company) assets, and various other
utterances and acts which suggest too weak a faith in the reality of the
corporate fiction, is sufficient to make the shareholder unlimitedly liable.
All of the latter kinds of "indicia" of [instrumentality] . . .are, upon
analysis, singularly lacking in direct relevance to the question of the
existence, and the amount, of harm caused the outside creditor by the

130. See id. at 32 (quoting 6 CAvrrc-, supra note 43, § 120.0512][b]).
131. PRESSER, supra note 6, § 2.02, at 2-8 n.10.
132. l
133. Professor Powell himself notes that some elements of tehe eleven-point inquiry
indicate misconduct. POWELL, supra note 26, § 6(h)-(k), at 17-19, § 13(e), at 75.
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misbehavior of the controlling shareholder. Yet these indicia do at least
suggest that fraudulent transfers may have taken place . . . and when
sufficiently suffused with intimations and evidence of some actual selfdealing, may create the appearance of a justification for going beyond the
limits imposed by doctrine."
As a result, the "innocent instrumentality" shareholder is not unduly
threatened. The disjunctive test applied by the Alaska Supreme Court
resembles its conjunctive test in that some wrongdoing must be shown to
pierce the veil. However, the tests differ in the degree of wrongdoing
required. The conjunctive test requires a strong showing of misconduct
that defeats public convenience, justifies wrong, commits fraud, or defends
crime. On the other hand, the disjunctive test requires only that the
decision to pierce the veil under the instrumentality prong be supported by
some suggestion offraud-like misuse of the corporateform, i.e., that the
control itself was suspicious or improper. Thus, the misconduct aspect of
the instrumentality prong entails a much less stringent requirement. 135
Of course, if the more serious misconduct satisfying the conjunctive test
were present, the court employing the disjunctive test could still pierce the
veil.
Consideration of the results of the court's eleven-factor analyses in
cases where the court pierced the veil demonstrates that the instrumentality
examination tends to uncover inherent misconduct. In McKibben v.
Mohawk Oil Co., 136 the subsidiary that existed as a co-venturer was
clearly a shell corporation created for the purpose of limiting liability with
regard to the speculative mining venture. 137 In such a transaction, the
contracting parties have expectations as to corporate control and liability
and make business decisions in reliance on those expectations. 38 Based
on the facts of McKibben, the court was probably concerned that the
plaintiff understood that the parent corporation would be liable for its

134. Clark, supra note 3, at 553 (footnotes omitted).
135. This is consistent with Professor Fessler's analysis of the piercing cases. While
Professor Fessler does not address the dichotomy of the conjunctive and disjunctive tests,
he does point out that in the classical inquiry into misconduct, the "big wrong" was "being
deflated" to the point where "the 'big' had gone out of the 'wrong."' Fessler, supra note
1, at 58-59. Professor Fessler's article and this note both maintain that the court has
advanced a liberal test under which an inquiry into control or instrumentality is the preferred
standard. Nonetheless, the court has been reluctant to pierce absent some showing, however
minor, of corporate misuse or misconduct.
136. 667 P.2d 1223 (Alaska 1983).
137. Nine of the eleven Powell factors existed. The subsidiary was created, entirely
owned, financed and directed by the parent. Furthermore, the corporation had no employees
and was severely undercapitalized. Finally, there was commingling of assets and property,
indicating a relationship with the corporation that might have prompted a third party to
believe that the parent bore some responsibility for the actions and obligations of the
subsidiary. laL at 1230.
138. Clark, supra note 3, at 543-44.
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subsidiary, which was inadequately capitalized given the transaction. In
Husky Oil N.P.R. Operations v. Sea Airmotive, Inc.,139 a sibling shell was
similarly created by a party to a fuel contract, allowing that party to make
a profit on fuel transfers effected through the sibling while representing
such transfers as being "at cost" as required by the contract.""4 In both
of these cases, the Powell inquiry was sufficient to uncover the fraud-like
misconduct of the corporate entities.
In contrast, the Powell inquiries that led to decisions declining to pierce
the veil did not uncover the type of deception or indicia of misuse noted
above. These decisions generally involved normal relations between
previously existing corporations or shareholders acting in typical situations.
In those cases, the level of control naturally found in parent/subsidiary and
close corporation contexts did exist, but there was no suggestion of misuse
connected to such control.
Many states considering the instant issue have adopted a conjunctive
test but have required a broader "injustice" prong, rather than a misconduct
prong, to supplement the control inquiry.' Such states naturally include
corporate misconduct as one possible form of injustice. The functional
application of Alaska's disjunctive test, with its inherent consideration of
instrumentality plus an additional lesser requirement of misuse or
"suspicious instrumentality," would qualify as an exemplar of a standard
utilizing a control inquiry with an injustice prong. Thus, while there is
extraterritorial support for both the strict conjunctive and disjunctive tests,
there is also support for Alaska's hybrid formulation.
IV. CONCLUSION:

A DISjuNCTrVE TEST FOR THE FUTURE

Notwithstanding the relative doctrinal confusion found in Alaska's veilpiercing cases, the decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court nonetheless
warrant the observation that "in spite of conflicting and misleading dicta
the judicial hunch usually comes through to a correct decision."'142 In

139. 724 P.2d 531 (Alaska 1986).
140. Id. at 533-34. Ninety-six percent of the stock of the sibling shell was owned by
the president of the party to the contract. Moreover, the shell had no income, employees
or equipment. Id.
141. For example, California requires "unity of interest and ownership" and an
"inequitable result" to pierce the veil. PRESSER, supra note 6 § 2.05, at 2-30 & n.44
(quoting Automotriz Del Golf, de Cal. S.A. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d '1 (Cal. 1957)). Likewise,
Arizona requires "alter ego" and a showing that "observance of the corporate form would
sanction a fraud or promote injustice." Id.supra note 6, § 2.03, at 2-10 (citing Employers
Liability Assurance Corp. v. Lunt, 313 P.2d 393 (Cal. 1957)).
142. Elvin R. Latty, The CorporateEntity as a Solvent of Legal Problems,34 MIcH. L.
REv. 597, 630 (1936).
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sum, the Alaska Supreme Court has reached correct, albeit initially
irreconcilable, decisions.
In essence, the court has disregarded the corporate entity in cases
where corporate forms have been misused either to constitute a mere
instrumentality or to effect more serious forms of misconduct. The court
has had difficulty in advancing a clear standard in cases in which there has
been a showing of instrumentality plus additional misconduct. In such
instances, its confusion and failure to clarify the proper test have led it to
phrase such decisions as implying dual requirements of instrumentality and
additional wrongdoing. Thus, the court has incorrectly suggested the
propriety of a conjunctive test, thereby clouding the veil-piercing doctrine
in Alaska.
The court's most recent veil-piercing decision in Murat v. F/V Shelikof
Strait143 is a positive step toward clarifying the propriety of the
disjunctive test. That decision, however, requires further development.
The Murat decision correctly conceptualized that there is some overlap
between instrumentality and misconduct. The Powell inquiry (and its
Uchitel adaptation to the individual shareholder/corporation context) can
in fact illuminate the misconduct prong. Nevertheless, the strictures
suggested in Murat are not completely desirable. The Powell control
inquiry should not be theformal method of examining misconduct. First,
the history of the court's decisions indicate the propriety of the disjunctive
test, while the Muratformulation of the standard effectively operates as a
conjunctive test."
Additionally, the Murat test might prove to be
underinclusive. One could imagine a situation in which there was
corporate misconduct but not of the type that would be revealed under a
Powell control inquiry.'
Such a situation would not result in piercing
the veil under Murat. Without the formal limitation of the Powell inquiry,
however, the court would be able to pierce the veil under the disjunctive
test.
It is important to preserve the separate inquiry into corporate action
which might tend to "defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit
fraud or defend crime," but might not necessarily amount to instrumentality
in the traditional (Powell) sense. The court has shown a reluctance to
pierce the veil without a showing of either "misconduct" under the
conjunctive test or the suggestion of misuse under the control prong of the
disjunctive test. This indicates that a construction of the Alaska test as a

143. 793 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1990).
144. See supra footnotes 89-93 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Eagle Air, Inc. v. Corroon & Black/Dawson & Co., 648 P.2d 1000
(Alaska 1982) (stripping the assets of a corporation not an element of Powell inquiry).
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conjunctive "control plus injustice"" test, similar to that formulated in
other states, would also be misplaced. That test encompasses a much
broader spectrum of corporate behavior than does the "control plus
suggestion of improper purpose or misuse" approach suggested by this
author. The injustice test as applied by other states would cover such
improper purposes, but they might exceed the degree of liberalization
desired by the Alaska Supreme Court.
The historical wisdom14 of the court and the logic of Murat suggest
a practicable approach that will best be served by a final adoption and
clarification of the disjunctive test."18 An Alaska court should pierce the
corporate veil where it finds either (1) excessive control amounting to
instrumentality (under the established quantitative inquiries) that also
suggests misuse or an improper purpose or (2) evidence of such corporate
misconduct that tends to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, commit
fraud or defend crime, but is not necessarily connected to excessive control.
Such a pronouncement by the court will preserve the integrity of limited
corporate liability and ensure that the principles and policies behind
incorporation in Alaska will not be disturbed. A consistent and predictable
veil-piercing doctrine will protect both investors and corporations by
clarifying the expectations that the court has for persons or entities utilizing
the corporate form.
Philip Reed Strauss

146. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
147. Under the proposed formulation of the doctrine, it appears that each of the court's
decisions detailed in this note reached the same result with respect to piercing the veil as
the optimistic Professor Latty would have predicted. See supranote 142 and accompanying
text.
148. Subsequent to the submission of this note, United States District Court Judge James
K. Singleton ruled that the "mere instrumentality" test alone was sufficient to justify a grant
of summary judgment piercing the veil under Alaska law, thereby indicating the propriety
of the disjunctive test. See City of Fairbanks v. Amoco, No. F-87-054 (D. Alaska April 2,

1992).

